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thropological concepts, which have been taken out of context and

applied without full understanding, have been misused by historians of colonial North America. Part of the difficulty is due to
the normal hazards of incorporating the work of another field in
one's own; and part is due to the reluctance of historians to
employ monothematic explanations. This latter difficulty has led
historians to favor those concepts of anthropology which are not
easily measured.
The interest
HISTORY, AND NATURAL HISTORY
of social historians in anthropology has been one-sided. Although
historians are excited about the work of Clifford Geertz, Victor
Turner, and Mary Douglas, they do not seem to feel the same
enthusiasm for the work of such antropologists as John Whiting,
Roy Rappaport, or Marvin Harris, or of Anthony Wallace, David
Schneider, or Marshall Sahlins, who are of equal importance
within the field. As a result historians have borrowed only what
was most like history as currently practiced: studies concerned
with ideas.
Anthropology has always been poised awkwardly between
history and natural history, its practitioners usually preferring one
of the two approaches, while granting that the other is also valid.
A recent statement in the Annual Reviews, a convenient source for
authoritative positions of this sort, sees the field divided into
ideational and adaptational conceptions of culture, under the renewed influence of Marxist thinking.1
There is still no agreement as to whether anthropology is
ANTHROPOLOGY,
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i Roger M. Keesing, "Theories of Culture," Annual Review of Anthropology,III (I974),
73-97. A recent addendum is Keesing's review of Marshall Sahlins, Culture and Practical
Reason (Chicago, 1976), in AmericanAnthropologist,LXXXII (i980), 130-13I.
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like a science which has laws. The statement by Geertz that we
must be content with interpretations, not laws, may have been
misinterpreted by many historians as a denial that there is much
regularity in human affairs-and therefore as a license to search
out what appears to be unique. Yet anthropologists of both persuasions stress that regularities and patterning underlie a diverse
range of societies or their parts. Many seek broad trends in cultural
evolution and explain them using a materialism which historians
may find uncongenial. At the same time, most anthropologists
deny that differences in cultures are attributable to the biological
differences of their members or that history has any predetermined course. Thus the materialist position, best (and certainly
most notoriously) represented by the work of Harris, declares
that the factors of demography, ecology, and the economy are
more fundamental than such superstructural ideas as the sacredness of cows to Hindus. This is an old controversy, but a real
one to most anthropologists today. It raises problems for historians who might wish to borrow anthropological concepts, especially those which are ideational.2
A basic problem for any discipline lies in
its choice of phenomena to study which are sufficiently welldefined that they can be located in actual data. Ideationalists focus
on rules and symbols; materialists on subsistence strategies and
population densities. Between these lie the great common-sense
units of study such as marriage, family, and community, which
have enabled anthropologists to uncover similarities within cultures around the world. It has been fairly easy to demonstrate that
forms which Western Europeans accepted as perfectly natural
were only one of several cultural variatio.:s on the same institution. But the range of examples discovered has been so great that
some scholars doubt whether it is possible to construct a universal
definition of these units. Are the most extreme examples really
instances of the same thing. Is marriage universal? Do all kinship
systems recognize both the father's and the mother's side of the
family as kin? Are there families in all societies? Do all societies
UNITS

OF ANALYSIS

2 Clifford Geertz, "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture," in
idem, The Interpretationof Cultures (New York, 1973), 3-30; Marvin Harris, Cultural
Materialism(New York, I979).
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have nuclear families? These and similar questions make it clear
that anthropology is presently at the limits of its terminology.3
The choice of significant units entails various conclusions
about human nature which become problematic for proponents
of different theoretical approaches to the study of man. The task
of choosing one for application in another discipline involves a
definite choice of theoretical perspective. To choose symbolic
dualisms or "role reversal" is to take a position in favor not only
of doing a certain kind of history, but also of doing a certain kind
of anthropology, and to risk some predictable criticisms. Ideational (or symbolic) anthropology is often seen as being too concerned with the strange, the wonderful, and the subjective at the
expense of the ordinary.
A further, disconcerting problem for historians who wish to
use the insights of anthropology is that anthropological concepts
are not easily transferrable. Their particularity is not helped by
the propensity of anthropologists over the years to study cultural
processes which have often turned out to have existed only in the
minds of the profession, for example the totemic complex,
mother right, tribe, clan, and village. Even Turner, who first
studied and named "communitas," reports that this concept is so
evanescent that it is no sooner noticed than it disappears.4
The most satisfactory, recent
AND
CONSENSUS
COMMUNITY
work on colonial America which uses anthropological insights is
that by Boyer and Nissenbaum on the Salem witchcraft hysteria.
By placing the dispute, and the parties to it, within the local
network of kinship and marriage ties, they showed how such ties
both united and separated the participants. This matter-of-fact
account uses the well-replicated and thoroughly discussed findings
of anthropology, particularly those of the British structuralist
school. Such a study is, no doubt, exactly what Thomas hoped
to encourage historians to undertake some twenty years ago when
he reviewed the potential of anthropological findings for history.5
3 A useful discussion of these problems runs through Ira R. Buchler and Henry A. Selby,
Kinship and Social Organization (New York, I968).
4 Victor Turner, The Ritual Process(Chicago, I968).
5 Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, Salem Possessed:The Social Origins of Witchcraft
(Cambridge, Mass., 1974); Keith Thomas, "History and Anthropology," Past & Present,
24 (I963),

3-24.
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However, the early attempts to import the family reconstitution methods of the Annales and Cambridge schools and combine them with concepts from social anthropology have resulted
in a misapplication of these concepts. For example, Lockridge, in
his book on Dedham, Massachusetts, considers the village more
or less in isolation from other villages in the Colony and treats it
as a "closed corporate peasant community" which is "self-shaping." To anthropologists a basic attribute of peasant societies is
that they are "part-societies with part-cultures" because they exist
in relationship to a more urbanized elite. Thus there is a possible
theoretical contradiction here between "peasant society" and
"self-shaping" which should have been addressed. The basic documentation for the study was derived from town records which
do not include the relevant materials from surrounding localities.
With regard to marriage, for instance, New England villages
during this period were only about 54 percent endogamous; some
46 percent of the young people found spouses in neighboring
towns, which suggests that Dedham was not the isolated world
of "relentless immobility" which Lockridge supposed.6
A different point of criticism would be to ask why a social
history is so concerned with the Revolution at the expense of the
theme of utopianism, which is stressed explicitly in the book but
is never used as a controlling model. Lockridge might equally
well have compared the town of Dedham with the many other
utopian communities for which we have good records and have
drawn some conclusion about the degree to which its fate was
typical of the set. Such an examination, however, would have
shifted the focus from history to social science. Moreover, we are
asked to regard Dedham as a typical example of the transformation of "a world we have lost" into something prototypically
American, though this generalization (also one of a social science)
goes unsubstantiated. Only later did colonial historians begin to
6 Kenneth Lockridge, A New England Town: The First HundredYears(New York, 1970),
I8-I9; George M. Foster, "Introduction: What Is a Peasant?" in Jack M. Potter et al.
(eds.), Peasantand Society: A Reader(Boston, I967), 2-I4; Adams and Alice Bee Kasakoff,
"Migration at Marriage in Colonial New England: A Comparison of Rates Derived
from Genealogies with Rates from Vital Records," in Bennett Dyke and Warren Morrill
(eds.), GenealogicalDemography(New York, I980); Lockridge, "The Population of Dedham, Massachusetts, I636-1735," EconomicHistory Review, XIX (I966), 318-344.
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compare their findings about single villages in New England with
each other, with other regions, and with Europe.7
Often in these studies the word "community" is used not
only to denote a small-scale settlement, such as a village, but also
to imply a warm and closely knit social group. This implied
correlation should alert us to ideological preferences. In the experience of anthropologists small villages are by no means always
warm and happy places; they typically have factions, feuds, and
even witchcraft accusations as part of their regular functioning.
Dissensus occurs with consensus, as happened in the case of
Salem.
BALINESE
COCKFIGHT
Recently, colonial historians have
shifted from studying towns to trying to discover one social
institution-a
Court Day, horse racing, gambling, or duellingwhich might be the equivalent of the Balinese cockfight which
Geertz suggested was a focus of widely held values in Bali. However, the nature of the Balinese cockfight and its possible universality has never been discussed by historians. Is there any reason
to believe that an equivalent might have existed in colonial America? To search one out is a task to which many anthropologists
would assign a low-priority, for not every culture has a ritual
which serves ethnologists as a unique focus for describing values.8
The Nuer, who otherwise have a culture of great paradigmatic value, have no institution which sums up their values,
although cattle were said by Evans-Pritchard to be at the center
of all Nuer interests. Someone searching for potential "Balinese
cockfights" among the Nuer would be frustrated, or would have
to redefine the concept substantially (making it more operational
in the process) to uncover even a reasonable surrogate. Indeed, a
more useful search might be for the reason why so few societies
develop this kind of focal institution.9
Besides the Balinese, the two best known examples of societies which have focal institutions are the Trobriand Islanders,
THE

7 For example, W. R. Prest, "Stability and Change in Old and New England: Clayworth
and Dedham,"Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, VI (1976), 359-374.
8 Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," in idem, The Interpretationof
Cultures, 412-453.

9

E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (New York, 1940), I6-50.
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who observe the Kula ring ritual, and the Kwakiutl, who have
the potlatch. Both are original examples of what Mauss called
"total social phenomena." But the Balinese, the Trobianders, and
the Kwakiutl have all developed self-consciously stratified societies, and lack an ideology of upward social mobility. Both the
Balinese and Kwakiutl conceptualize their societies as sets of permanent statuses which people occupy temporarily. Trobriand
chiefs, however, look forward to the receipt, and temporary ownership, of legendary, named valuables which circulate in perpetuity, while their owners are quickly replaced. In all three cases
the earthly order of things is permanent, and is suffused with a
sense of the importance of etiquette for the proper management
of status. 10
The frontier of colonial America is an unlikely place to find
the cultural equivalents of a Balinese cockfight, a Kula ring, or a
potlatch, given that, for those settlers who were interested in the
here and now, it was a new social beginning, and, for those to
whom it was but a temporary way station, other considerations
took precedence over earthly status. Yet there was a ritual in New
England which summed up the values of the society which practiced it: Sunday church-going, with the whole community arranged in pews which reflected the relative social ranking of the
parishioners, who came to hear a sermon embodying the dominant
values. Although the medium for their expression may seem too
prosaic to be a true equivalent of the exotic cockfight, the institution of church-going had the virtue, true as well of the cockfight, that the participants were undertaking a life-or-death wager,
not on their social status, but on their chance for salvation.1
If we were to accept this as a reasonable surrogate for the
cockfight, we would have to inquire as to whether other parts of
the model applied as well. Was New England actually more
stratified than is usually thought, or was it more worldly? Or
were these attributes of our putative model of a focal ritual simply
contingent? Perhaps other attributes were crucial. One possible
line of inquiry might be to determine the degree to which such
institutions bridge a disjunction between two audiences: the cockIo Marcel Mauss, The Gift (London, I954).
II Frederick Augustus Whitney, "A Church of the First Congregational Society in
Quincy, Mass., Built in 1732," New England Historical and GenealogicalRegister, XVIII
(1864), II7-131.

ANTHROPOLOGY

AND HISTORY

259

fight often pits members of one community against members of
another, as do the Kula ring and the potlatch. If we take this
condition as fundamental, then a Sunday church service in New
England would not be a viable example. Moreover, in all three
of the anthropological examples the rituals socially humiliate certain participants, without engendering any sense of religious humility in the process. They are the opposite of the ritual activity
which Turner has characterized as "communitas": an evanescent
historical moment in which a mood of human fellowship pervades
the social relations of people who are otherwise caught up in the
humanly divisive, hierarchical relations found in all societies. Potlatch, Kula, and cockfight, on the contrary, display social hierarchy.12

This is not the place to develop a model of such institutions,
but it is appropriate to consider them in order to suggest the kind
of comparative work that could be done by historians. No such
work was done by Beeman when he advised historians that an
unappreciated resource lay in Turner's concept of communitas.
In fact he proposed a misreading: Beeman mistakes it for something akin to Redfield's "community." Yet Turner's idea is precisely that communitas, being a transient mood, cannot be captured in any social institution, and that attempts to do so have
always failed. There is a certain nostalgia in Beeman's enthusiasm
for the concept (possibly true of Turner as well), which anthropology is being employed to erase. It is also symptomatic of the
preference for such ideological concepts that, although Beeman
should find Turner's work on communitas attractive, he has apparently overlooked the equally substantial contribution which
Turner made to the understanding of the politics of small villages
in which almost everyone was related and where witchcraft accusations were common. For that matter, which social historians
read The Lele or AgriculturalInvolution?13
Beeman seems to ask of Turner's work on communitas that
12 For a recent study which cites much of the relevant literature on stratification, see
William Pencak, "The Social Structure of Revolutionary Boston: Evidence from the Great
Fire of I76o,"Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, X (1979), 267-278.
13 Richard R. Beeman, "The New Social History and the Search for 'Community' in
Colonial America," American Quarterly, XXIX (I977), 422-443; Turner, Ritual Process;
Robert Redfield, The Little Community(Chicago, 1955); idem, Peasant Society and Culture
(Chicago, 1955); Turner, Schism and Continuity in an African Society (Manchester, 1957).
Mary Douglas, The Lele (London, 1954); Geertz, AgriculturalInvolution (Chicago, I963).
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it cure the theoretical disjunction which Beeman experiences between structure and psychology, that is, between a science of
society which focuses impersonally on the structure of a group
and a science which depicts lives of individuals in readily intuited
psychological descriptions. Yet the dialectical oscillation between
hierarchy and communitas is precisely Turner's way of dramatizing the ever-present gap between structure and psychology and
his way of asserting that it can never be finally overcome.14
To investigate historical phenomena by means of concepts
like communitas and the Balinese cockfight without examining
them is to engage in la pensee sauvage. It is also utopian thinking
in the case of communitas, and a complete misunderstanding of
the nature of history and cross-cultural comparison in the case of
the Balinese cockfight.
When a ritual event is alleged to be, in effect, the
total activity of an entire town, as is the case in so many studies,
it is essential to break through that sort of immaterial conception
to place it in the more immediate context of ordinary daily life.
Waters' characterization of Guilford, Connecticut, as made up of
stem-family households is an example of deliberate exoticism used
to suggest the rootedness of the settlers as contrasted with our
own supposedly more rootless times. He ignores the fact that
there must be sufficient people of the right sex and age in Guilford
for stem-family households to be common, and that no such type,
given the nature of the variables, can ever solely characterize a
society. Indeed, if there is any law in anthropology, it is a law of
exceptions: that variations will be found in every rule or pattern.15
The concept of the stem family household cannot be applied
to New England, as computer simulation shows. Herein lies a
potential trap for unwary historians who use ideas from anthropology: there is a widespread, persistent feeling that anthropologists study exotic customs, whereas it is truer to say that they
study the mundane in exotic locales. As for the exotic itself, they
seem always to reduce it to some (outlandishly) commonsense
EXOTICISM

14 Beeman, "New Social History," 431, n. I8.
John Waters, "Patrimony, Succession, and Social Stability: Guilford, Connecticut, in
the Eighteenth Century," Perspectivesin AmericanHistory, X (I976), I3I-I60.
IS
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explanation, such as that ritual cannibalism is a response to protein
deficiency.16
Far from examining only the curious ritual occasion, anthropologists begin by counting populations and mapping villages.
They hope that, by spending a year in the field, they can shed
light, not only on the natives' way of life, but on their unconscious
expectations as well. Since the exotic is only so in relation to our
own culture, anthropologists have a professional distrust of the
exotic, and at times virtually refuse to recognize that it exists.
A major difficulty in the development of knowledge in both
ethnography and history is precisely this culture of the investigator, which even now goes largely unexamined because it resists
discovery. Outsiders see it readily enough, which makes fieldwork on an island in the Pacific both easy and intellectually satisfying in ways which elude students of their own backyards,
including historians of colonial America. What we do need to
find out is whether what we study is ordinary and mundane, or
whether the ordinary and mundane is merely a more pernicious
version of our culture's commonsense understanding of things.
Similarly it is important for historians to continue asking why
they study particular phenomena.
In the next decade both anthropology and
I980S
will
themselves become topics for investigation, as natural
history
history has become for historians. The emerging ethnology will
be one which examines the ordinary and the folklife, not the
unusual, the highbrow, or the exotic. As anthropologists we will
undertake research which parallels that of history without people,
and of processual history, while social historians will examine
implicit assumptions of daily life, which are free of the officially
declared, contemporary values, and have not been formally ritualized by the community. Demos' use of the implications for
daily living of the sizes and locations of rooms in Plymouth
houses and Boyer and Nissenbaum's uncovering of the network
of kinship in Salem are examples of such research. The common
sense of a culture dwells close to material constraints-and does
not question them. It will be our job to discover the premises
TOWARD THE

I6

Kenneth Wachter et al., Statistical Studies of Historical Social Structure(New York,

1978).
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which underlie this common sense and justify behavior as perfectly natural.17
Anthropologists have had little feeling for how the daily
activities of the peoples that they study could become historical.
Theirs is a wholly different perspective on daily life from that of
historians, who write with the advantage of hindsight. Which
historians can look at people's lives and not think of those contemporaneous events which history has singled out as important?
Historians implicitly scrutinize all behavior for its potential relationship to the eventful. Anthropologists have their comparable
teleological flaw: that everything they see during their short stints
of fieldwork must be integrated in some way. Foucault, a social
historian, has presented a solution to this latter problem in his call
for an archaeology of knowledge. He suggests that we regard the
array of facts at a given moment as if it were one layer of an
archaeological dig, in which some elements cluster in meaningful
association, but where others simply happen to be there and elude
connection with the clusters. Anthropologists might, in turn,
remind historians of colonial America that not every action has
a cumulative historical goal.18
Here are two very different conceptions of human activity:
the anthropologist's, which seldom conceives of the possibility
that the moments of daily life might lead to anything for the
history books; and the historian's, which often must see in each
and every moment a determinant of some significant future or an
exemplification of some significant past. At best (or worst?) anthropologists think of mundane actions as representative of sociothese principles are not confused with
logical principles-although
the actor's motivations.
At first anthropologists considered human action as something of an end in itself, a timeless round of custom. But this false
start gave way to the discovery of a repertory of goals which
were commonsensical and maximizing: to obtain a good harvest,
to outdo a neighbor in gift-giving, to marry well, to get better
17 On anthropology see Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism(New
York, 1972); on "history" see loan M. Lewis, "Introduction," in idenm(ed.), History and
Social Anthropology (London, I968). Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York,
1970). John Demos, A Little Cotnimonwealth(New York, 1970); Boyer and Nissenbaum,
Salem Possessed.
18 Foucault, The Archaeologyof Knolvledge(New York, 1972).
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land, or to maintain one's following. This discovery restored to
the pages of ethnographic description a goal-oriented actor, but
one who was concerned with everyday activities not epic deeds.
To anthropologists who are not much concerned with action
from its historical perspective, many historians of colonial America seem to have their ears always cocked to the distant rumblings
of the Revolution. This teleology gives the work of historians an
idealistic cast. Historians might try to forget the eventful in favor
of a history of simpler, everyday life. There is after all a major
difference between behavior which is self-consciously trying to
be historical and behavior which turns out to be historical.
Recently Geertz suggested the metaof
behavior
social
as
text
as a supplement for, or replacement
phor
of, the current metaphors of role-playing and games. To anthropologists this would transfer the traditions of literary interpretation to the study of behavior and thereby reframe behavior in a
less reductionistic manner by suggesting that it is at least as complex, meaningful, and ambiguous as a good novel or poem. If the
metaphor of text were to be adopted generally as a perspective,
social anthropology would be even less inclined to turn the salient
institutions of one society into ideal types for use in examining
the social life of neighboring societies.19
However, if text were to become fashionable as a way of
bringing to anthropology the baggage of post-structuralist literary
criticism, with its concern for conjunctures, the mirror phase, and
intertextuality, the course of inquiry in social anthropology would
probably shift to a rethinking of normative authority; to a deemphasis on the psychic unity of mankind in favor of uncovering
the significant differences between ourselves and "The Others"
whom we study; and to a concern with what is missing in a
people's discourse and in our ethnographies.
What this refocusing would not emphasize is the sense of
text as historians most frequently use it-as a vehicle for knowledge about the past. To be more relevant for historians the metaphor would have to be extended from the documents themselves
THE METAPHOR OF TEXT

I9 Geertz, "Blurred Genres: The Refiguration of Social Thought," The AmericanScholar,
XLIX (I980), I65-179; see also Alton L. Becker, "Text-Building, Epistemology, and
Aesthetics in Javanese Shadow Theater," in idem and Aram Yengoyan (eds.), The Imagination f Reality (Norwood, N.J., I979), 211-243.
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to the behavior described within them, behavior which is often
ambivalent and polyvalent.
The sense of unity and decorum of a narrative, the sense of
what is an integral part of any story is a basic part of the everyday
culture in which it is told. When Greven tells us that the basic
goal of the inhabitants of Andover was to remain in Andover,
preferably on the family farm, but that demography and land
shortage prevented them from doing so; that in the third generation the sons of Andover were obliged to migrate to new lands;
and that this restlessness was a cause of the Revolution, we have
not progressed very far from the old-fashioned history of events.
merely replaces Governor Thomas Dudley (or
Demography
as
the villain of the story. It behooves historians to
whomever)
learn about the general form of narrative. The metaphor of text
should be useful in this discovery, especially since there has been
a recent call to return to the narrative.20
Historians of colonial America, often portray their subjects as
behaving with a view to their place in the history books. This is
especially noticeable to anthropologists because we are so often
unable to give any account of history in our descriptions. The
subjects of ethnographies are usually constrained to behave only
with regard to finite tasks in the realm of common sense. This
perspective presents us with problems but, from the anthropologists' point of view, much of social history is misconceived
because of the teleology of historians' hindsight.
My depiction of social history is obviously too dark and too
much drawn with the parochial bias of an outsider. But it raises
important issues for the writing of history and of anthropology.
First, to what extent do our data really mesh? And second, to
what extent does social life have a historical goal which transcends
immediate situations? My answers are those of the skeptic.
Historians have worried about these same issues and anthropologists have not absorbed everything they might from the practice of history. The place of a historical consciousness in ethnog20
PhilipJ. Greven, Jr., Four Generations:Population,Land, andFamily in Colonial Andover,
Massachusetts(Ithaca, 1970). A useful introduction to narrative analysis is Claude Bremond,
Logiquedu recit (Paris, I973). Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on
a New Old History," Past & Present, 85 (I979), 3-24.
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raphy will have to be reassessed. First, historians who are
interested in social or cultural history should try to eliminate
exotica and fantasies of a Golden Age of community. Instead,
they should turn more scrupulously to the mundane, with its
pettiness and dissensions, as well as its cooperativeness. If historians borrow from anthropology, it should be with the intention
of developing the concepts borrowed and of making, in return,
a contribution to anthropology. Either social history is anthropology or it is nothing. Dabbling with it will do no good. Historians must reflect on what they borrow.
Second, as part of a general trend toward self-consciousness,
both historians and anthropologists will study history and folk
history in particular, and its uses in our own culture. What do
ordinary people take to be history? Why do television writers see
history as a series of lucky moments for the uniquely gifted
protagonists of a true story? These are the kinds of questions
which anthropologists ask of preliterate peoples. As they shift
their attention to groups within our own culture, they will ask
these questions of us.
Third, when anthropologists have identified the common
sense of our culture, they will want to see how and when it was
institutionalized. Research along these lines would be a useful
extension of Foucault's attempts to uncover the archaeology of
the more highbrow concepts in our society. An even more recent
example of a historian's work along these lines is Ginzburg,
"Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock Holmes."21
History must become more reflexive about its goals and
about the means it uses to realize its ends. To anthropologists the
lack of interest in theory among historians still seems great. But
borrowing concepts from another discipline does not hold out
much promise either if the concepts are simply misused in a
thoughtless way.
For example, Foucault, Madnessand Civilization (New York, I965); idem, Discipline
2I
and Punishment (New York, 1979). Carlo Ginzburg, "Morelli, Freud, and Sherlock
Holmes," History Workshop,IX (I980), 5-36.

